Present doctrine of atonement fallacies

[pnattmbtc]

f:In that case is God's knowledge complete, or does he learn things like we are? Is He truly infinite?

J:I think a study of the prophecies shows that God's knowledge is complete.

[Nic Samojluk]

Why do you choose to believe Ellen White on this point, when you reject her on so many other points, such as what she wrote in PP 63-66 about God's planning for Christ's death?

[Nic Samojluk]

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"Before the foundations of the world were laid, Christ, the Only Begotten of God, pledged Himself to become the Redeemer of the human race, should Adam sin." {1SM 226.1}

Thanks for the quote. Very interesting that our prophet would say that.

There is another statement by Mrs. White which describes the fall of Adam and Eve on a contingency basis. I did try to locate it, but the website is busy. We should remember as well that Isaiah 53:10 is also being rendered on a contingency basis by many modern Bible translators.

[fccool]

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I defined the future as the union of future possibilities.

And that's where the problem stems from

1) Defining possibility as something that will or will not occur

2) Defining the future as union of something that will or will not occur

If you define it in such manner, you make a mistake of ignoring that not occurrence of something is likewise an occurrence. Likewise, by not occuring, all of those possibilities are occuring at the same time.

There's no "future" there's no "past" in relation to us. With human beings there's only "now". Future is anticipation of "now", and past is a record of "now" - either mental or physical.

Possibility as you define it, is not "able to happen", but as "having multiple probabilities of more than 0 and less than a %100".

There was an italian guy called Finetti, and he upset the statistical community quite a bit in 70s by saying something astounding along the lines of "probability is a religion of human mind that does not exist"... i.e. the probability is an expression of observer's view, and that it's meaningless to populate the actual reality with rather obstruct concepts to understand the outcome.

So, if you look at the attached diagram, what we would call reality is blue, everything else is a construct of mind. It does not exist and it will never exist.

It's illogical to define reality of choice in terms of probability because you assign randomness classification to an event that is not random at all. Randomness is a relative concept, especially when we consider our view and God's view... and even on human level, the concept of randomness is relative to an observer. What may seem random to you, may not be random to me.

For example, in terms of computer encryption... one could view an encoded message as random characters, but for a person who knows how to decode the message... it would not be random at all.

To give you a hypothetical example to show you what I'm talking about... let's say there's a 10 different duplicates of our reality in which a subject is presented with a choice of numbers from 1-10. He can likewise decide not to choose if that's what he wants.

What do you think the outcome would be in each of the exact copies of reality? Would these be "random" as such that the subject would choose a different number in each reality, or would it be exactly the same choice in each single copy of reality?

Do you see what I'm getting at? In given circumstances, the outcome is always the same. That's the principle that empirical science is based on.

Which brings me to the next point which is very important. Human beings don't make random choices. Their choices are planned and deliberate, meaning that these are not stand-alone. In the universe created to follow the laws of physics, there's no such thing as randomness, even in a mind of the subject. Our choices are not random. These constrained to a certain knowledge and belief.

That's why in the Bible, God does not punish for sins that resolve from "our lack of foreknowledge" so to speak, but does despise those that intentionally break the law with full understanding of implications. The punishment for the former was a slap on the wrist, the punishment for the latter was death.

The above is the reason why I don't define free will in context of "possibility", but rather our ability to do something, which does not carry a probabilistic tone.

Thus, when I say "it's possible for me to jump 6 feet up", is not the same as "I might jump 6 feet up and I might jump 5, or I might not jump at all". It's two different concepts of choice. The latter one does not deal with reality of things, because by definition... reality is not a possibility... it's certainty. Defining the reality in terms of possibilities of it is like playing "what if" with history. It's a mental exercise. And, ironically, you are defining free will in a context of mental exercise rather than reality.

[fccool]

PS... in case you don't want to plow through my thoughts above I'll sum it up for you.

By defining the future events as "not certain" you in fact defining them by means of statistical definition of "random".

Random - Statistics . of or characterizing a process of selection in which each item of a set has a equal [or "possible i.e. existing] probability of being chosen.

So, to answer... I don't believe that defining free will in context of probability would be right thing to do. Free will MUST BE defined in context of ABILITY where it's immediate meaning lies.

To give you a hypothetical example to show you what I'm talking about... let's say there's a 10 different duplicates of our reality in which a subject is presented with a choice of numbers from 1-10. He can likewise decide not to choose if that's what he wants.

What do you think the outcome would be in each of the exact copies of reality? Would these be "random" as such that the subject would choose a different number in each reality, or would it be exactly the same choice in each single copy of reality?

Do you see what I'm getting at? In given circumstances, the outcome is always the same. That's the principle that empirical science is based on. Not randomness, but ability to predict something with certainty... given complete understanding of variables.

Free will... two words:

1) Free - not controlled by obligation or the will of another

2) Will - The mental faculty by which one deliberately chooses or decides upon a course of action

In the immediate context there's no implication of posibility in terms of probability.

[fccool]

There is another statement by Mrs. White which describes the fall of Adam and Eve on a contingency basis. I did try to locate it, but the website is busy. We should remember as well that Isaiah 53:10 is also being rendered on a contingency basis by many modern Bible translators.

"The kingdom of grace was instituted immediately after the fall of man, when a plan was devised for the redemption of the guilty race" (Great Controversy, p. 347)

And yet:

The great plan, devised before the foundations of the earth were laid, was successfully carried out.—Manuscript Releases, vol. 3, p. 426 (1898).

We do not sympathize with God as we should in the salvation of the human race. We do not regard it in the light in which it is viewed by the universe of Heaven, as a plan devised from eternity in the mind of God.—Bible Training School, Sept. 1, 1908.

[pnattmbtc]

Regarding #380962, I didn't say anything randomness, nor did that enter into my thought process. I'm wondering what I said that made you think of randomness.

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The above is the reason why I don't define free will in context of "possibility", but rather our ability to do something,

And this has been my point. This the compatibilistic definition, called such because it is compatible with determinism. This is the definition which Calvinists use. I was going to say "traditionally use," but I don't know of any exceptions. However, Calvinism is quite broad, so I suppose it might be possible that there are some Calvinists somewhere who didn't have the same idea of free will as you have, but I don't see how that would be possible.

Otoh, the idea that Adventists have traditionally had is that free will is the ability to effect an outcome; the genuine ability to "choose this instead of that" or vice versa.

I'd expect that those who say they have been agreeing with you have the view of "free will" that I'm speaking of now, the incompatibilisitc (or libertarian) one, and have been saying they agree with you because they've only focused on the question of God's having exhaustive definite foreknowledge (regarding which both Calvinists and Arminianists agree).

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which does not carry a probabilistic tone.

Thus, when I say "it's possible for me to jump 6 feet up", is not the same as "I might jump 6 feet up and I might jump 5, or I might not jump at all". It's two different concepts of choice. The latter one does not deal with reality of things, because by definition... reality is not a possibility... it's certainty.

I disagree. Consider subatomic particles. Even as an inanimate object, these don't seem to fit this idea. When you consider that sentient beings with free will have the ability to effect future outcomes (choose "this" instead of "that," or vice versa), there's no certainty here. The person might choose A, or they might choose B, with certain probabilities, between 0 and 1, given that they might actually choose either one.

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Defining the reality in terms of possibilities of it is like playing "what if" with history.

No, it's fundamentally different. And this is the crux of our disagreement, which I've been stressing from the beginning.

The future is fundamentally different from the past. When we discuss the past, the "what if" scenarios are things which we know have a 0% probability of having occurred. But the future is a fundamentally different beast.

This is why I've been saying our disagreement is an ontological one as opposed to an epistemological one. In your view the future is comprised of certainties, whereas in my view it is comprised of possibilities.

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It's a mental exercise. And, ironically, you are defining free will in a context of mental exercise rather than reality.

No, I'm defining it in terms of reality. Or, I should say, what I believe reality to be, as opposed to what you believe it to be. And, again, this is the crux of our disagreement. What is the reality of the future like? (that's how I'd put it; you might just say, "What is reality like?" or, more elegantly, "What is reality?")

When we get to the question of foreknowledge, I'm saying that you and I agree that God has perfect foreknowledge, in terms of seeing the future perfectly, just as it is. But was disagree what it is that God sees.

[pnattmbtc]

PS... in case you don't want to plow through my thoughts above I'll sum it up for you.

By defining the future events as "not certain" you in fact defining them by means of statistical definition of "random".

Random - Statistics . of or characterizing a process of selection in which each item of a set has a equal [or "possible i.e. existing] probability of being chosen.

[fccool]

I agree that you are recognizing my view as compatibalism. I disagree that this is what Calvin believed. I've already demonstrated and quoted Arminius on this point. He did not believe your view of free will. He was in fact compatibalist.

The main points of Calvinism is that in fact our will is not free. Adam had free will, he lost it to sin, and now God has to make a decision that we can't make for ourselves. They ascribe to compatibalism to soften the blow. It's very contradictory. We can't choose God, and God chooses on our behalf to be saved, yet we have free will? Explain that to me? How is that compatibalism? It's a total rejection of free will by any definition of it. Sin nature causes us to do evil, God causes us to do good.

Arminius believed that men are not born totally depraved... with ability to choose either good or bad. That's the core issue for Arminian view. Calvinism states that men are totally depraved = spiritually dead, and can't choose God on their own. Arminianism states that yes, men can choose God on their own, because they are not totally depraved.

Arminius and Wesley never prescribed a view of free will that you claim is his. If he did, I'd like to see evidence of it.

[pnattmbtc]

Quote:

I agree that you are recognizing my view as compatibalism. I disagree that this is what Calvin believed.

You were addressing a different aspect. Regarding the idea that a person has free will if he is free to do that which he chooses, Calvin agreed with this idea. Why do you think not?

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I've already demonstrated and quoted Arminius on this point. He did not believe your view of free will. He was in fact compatibalist.

I looked and looked for this, and couldn't find it. Sorry to ask you for extra work, but could you cite this again? Also, in looking back over things you wrote, I noticed sometimes there are no references for the quotes. Please include the references for the quotes.

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The main points of Calvinism is that in fact our will is not free. Adam had free will, he lost it to sin, and now God has to make a decision that we can't make for ourselves. They ascribe to compatibalism to soften the blow. It's very contradictory. We can't choose God, and God chooses on our behalf to be saved, yet we have free will? Explain that to me?

They believe that "free will" means the ability to do that which you choose to do. Same idea that you have, as far as I can tell.

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How is that compatibalism?

Because it's compatible with determinism. Again, the same thing you're arguing, as far as I can see. What is the difference that you see?

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It's a total rejection of free will by any definition of it. Sin nature causes us to do evil, God causes us to do good.

Arminius believed that men are not born totally depraved... with ability to choose either good or bad. That's the core issue for Arminian view. Calvinism states that men are totally depraved = spiritually dead, and can't choose God on their own. Arminianism states that yes, men can choose God on their own, because they are not totally depraved.

I don't think this is quite accurate. Could you quote something please?

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Arminius and Wesley never prescribed a view of free will that you claim is his. If he did, I'd like to see evidence of it.

Fair enough. Something I enjoy about these discussions is the chance it gives to learn things. I know Arminisism agrees with the points I've made, but much of Arminianism was developed after Arminius. So the exact timing of ideas I'm not clear on. I'll try to find out.

Be that as it may, what I quoted here is accurate:

Quote:

For example, you could choose to continue reading or to stop reading this article; while a compatibilist determinist would not deny that whatever choice you make will have been predetermined since the beginning of time, they will argue that this choice that you make is an example of free will because no one is forcing you to make whatever choice you make. In contrast, someone could be holding a gun to your head and tell you that unless you read the article, (s)he will kill you; to some compatibilists, that is an example of a lack of free will. And these would argue for inclusion of such internal compulsions as kleptomania or addiction. Other compatibilists would disregard a gun as limiting free will, as one can defy a gun and be shot, even though one cannot break free of strong handcuffs....

Critics of compatibilism often focus on the definition of free will: they agree that the compatibilists are showing something to be compatible with determinism, but they think that something cannot properly be called free will. Incompatibilists are happy to accept that lack of coercion is a necessary criterion for free will (a coerced act is not free), but doubt that is sufficient (an un-coerced act is free). They believe "free will" refers to genuine (e.g. absolute, ultimate) alternate possibilities for beliefs, desires or actions, rather than merely counterfactual ones. In the absence of such possibilities, the belief that free will confers responsibility is held to be false.

The underlined part is the issue of compatibilism, and incompatibilism, that I have been focusing on.

[Guest]

I agree that you are recognizing my view as compatibalism. I disagree that this is what Calvin believed. I've already demonstrated and quoted Arminius on this point. He did not believe your view of free will. He was in fact compatibalist.

The main points of Calvinism is that in fact our will is not free. Adam had free will, he lost it to sin, and now God has to make a decision that we can't make for ourselves. They ascribe to compatibalism to soften the blow. It's very contradictory. We can't choose God, and God chooses on our behalf to be saved, yet we have free will? Explain that to me? How is that compatibalism? It's a total rejection of free will by any definition of it. Sin nature causes us to do evil, God causes us to do good.

Arminius believed that men are not born totally depraved... with ability to choose either good or bad. That's the core issue for Arminian view. Calvinism states that men are totally depraved = spiritually dead, and can't choose God on their own. Arminianism states that yes, men can choose God on their own, because they are not totally depraved.

Amen....

[fccool]

Quote:

I looked and looked for this, and couldn't find it. Sorry to ask you for extra work, but could you cite this again? Also, in looking back over things you wrote, I noticed sometimes there are no references for the quotes. Please include the references for the quotes.

Sure,

Quote:

The understanding of God is certain and infallible: So that He sees certainly and infallibly even things future and contingent; whether He sees them in their causes, or in themselves. But this infallibility depends on the infinity of the essence of God, and not on His unchangeable will.

James Arminius, "Seventy-Nine Private Disputations: Disputation XVII. On the Understanding of God," in The Works of Arminius, trans. James Nichols (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1986), 2:341.

Quote:

"From this follows the fourth decree to save certain particular persons and to damn others, which decree rests upon the foreknowledge of God, but which he has known from eternity which persons should believe according to such an administration of the means serving to repentance and faith through his preceding grace and which should persevere through subsequent grace, and also who should not believe and persevere."

James Arminius, The Works of James Arminius, I (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1825-1828), 247-48.

Quote:

"Prediction sometimes follows this prescience, when it pleases God to give intimations to His creatures of the issues of things, before they come to pass. But neither prediction nor any prescience induces a necessity of any thing [futurae] that is afterwards to be, since they are [in the divine mind] posterior in nature and order to the thing that is future. For a thing does not come to pass because it has been foreknown or foretold; but it is foreknown and foretold because it is yet [futura] to come to pass."

Millard J. Erickson (quoting Arminius), What Does God Know and When Does He Know It? The Current Controversy Over Divine Foreknowledge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 87

Then the contrast of certainty in foreknowledge and certainty because of God's action, to make it clear.

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"It is an absurd assertion that 'from prescience that necessity follows in the same way.' For what God foreknows, He foreknows because it is to take place in the future. But what He decrees, purposes, and determines in Himself to do, takes place thus because He decrees it."

Ibid

Here's how Wesley explains the problem with your assumption:

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"We must not think they are because he knows them. No; he knows them because they are. Just as I (if one may be allowed to compare the things of men with the deep things of God) now know the sun shines: Yet the sun does not shine because I know it, but I know it because he shines. My knowledge supposes the sun to shine; but does not in anywise cause it. In like manner, God knows that man sins; for he knows all things: Yet we do not sin because he knows it, but he knows it because we sin; and his knowledge supposes our sin, but does not in anywise cause it. In a word, God, looking on all ages, from the creation to the consummation, as a moment, and seeing at once whatever is in the hearts of all the children of men, knows everyone that does or does not believe, in every age or nation. Yet what he knows, whether faith or unbelief, is in nowise caused by his knowledge. Men are as free in believing or not believing as if he did not know it at all."

John Wesley, "Sermon LVIII, On Predestination," in The Works of John Wesley, Vol. 6, Second Series (54-86), (Sage Digital Library Collected Works), 255-6.

It should be absolutely clear that neither Arminius nor Wesley rejected certainty in foreknowledge, and that Open Theism is a complete departure from Arminian/Weslean understanding of foreknowledge of God.

Thus, if you truly believe that we as SDAs define free will based on your definition, and in fact reject God's foreknowledge, then with whole honesty... stop ascribing it to Arminian/Weslean tradition. It is not. What you are describing is in fact 1 to 1 match of beliefs of Open Theism that merely hijack Arminianism.

[fccool]

Here's a good study on Open Theism (to which you ascribe) and Arminianism (to which I ascribe)

http://www.agts.edu/faculty/faculty_publications/articles/railey_open-theism.pdf

[pnattmbtc]

I saw much about foreknowledge, but not about free will. I was asking about free will. I'm wanting to get definitions in place regarding free will, so we understand what one another means, before going on to discuss foreknowledge. Given how difficult it has been to do this simple thing, I think this has been a good choice on my part. Also, helpful for future discussions.

So please bear in mind for the last week or so, I've been focusing on this one thing, apart from a few incidental arguments that were raised before, and that's to establish definitions of free will that we can both agree to what we mean.

What I've been saying in relation to what SDAs believe is that the definition of *free will* that Adventists traditionally hold to is the libertarian one, in terms of a person having free will if he can genuinely effect different possible future options NOT merely because he is not forced to act contrary to one's will.

[pnattmbtc]

The study deals with foreknowledge, not free will. Open Theists agree with Arminians in regards to free will.