Present doctrine of atonement fallacies

[pnattmbtc]

This is from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism_and_incompatibilism.

"Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent (people who hold this belief are known as compatibilists).

Incompatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are logically incompatible categories.

Compatibilism, as championed by the ancient Greek Stoics, Hume and many contemporary philosophers,[weasel words] is a theory that argues that if free will and determinism exist they are in fact compatible. Determinists argue that all acts that take place are predetermined by prior causes, including human actions. If a free action is defined as one that is not predetermined by prior causes, then determinism, which claims that human actions are predetermined, rules out the possibility of free actions.

A compatibilist, or soft determinist, in contrast, will define a free act in a way that does not hinge on the presence or absence of prior causes. For example, one could define a free act as one that involves no compulsion by another person. Since the physical universe and the laws of nature are not persons, actions which are caused by the laws of nature would still be free acts- therefore it is wrong to conclude that universal determinism would mean we are never free.

For example, you could choose to continue reading or to stop reading this article; while a compatibilist determinist would not deny that whatever choice you make will have been predetermined since the beginning of time, they will argue that this choice that you make is an example of free will because no one is forcing you to make whatever choice you make. In contrast, someone could be holding a gun to your head and tell you that unless you read the article, (s)he will kill you; to some compatibilists, that is an example of a lack of free will. And these would argue for inclusion of such internal compulsions as kleptomania or addiction. Other compatibilists would disregard a gun as limiting free will, as one can defy a gun and be shot, even though one cannot break free of strong handcuffs.

Further, according to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires. That is, when one says that one could either continue to read this page or to delete it, one doesn't really mean that both choices are compatible with the complete state of the world right now, but rather that if one had desired to delete it one would have, even though as a matter of fact one actually desires to continue reading it, and therefore that is what will actually happen.

Hume also maintains that free acts are not uncaused (or self-caused as Kant argued) but rather caused by our choices as determined by our beliefs, desires, by our characters, or just for the hell of it (spontaneous random act). While a decision-making process exists in Hume's determinism, this process is governed by a causal chain of events. For example, one may make the decision to support a charity, but that decision is determined by the conditions that existed prior to the decision being made.

Critics of compatibilism often focus on the definition of free will: they agree that the compatibilists are showing something to be compatible with determinism, but they think that something cannot properly be called free will. Incompatibilists are happy to accept that lack of coercion is a necessary criterion for free will (a coerced act is not free), but doubt that is sufficient (an un-coerced act is free). They believe "free will" refers to genuine (e.g. absolute, ultimate) alternate possibilities for beliefs, desires or actions, rather than merely counterfactual ones. In the absence of such possibilities, the belief that free will confers responsibility is held to be false.

However, a compatibilist may respond to the argument mentioned above stating that non-determinism is also incompatible with free will, so the Libertarian is no better off. The compatibilist may also argue on conceptual grounds that "free will" has nothing to do with ultimate causes on a grand metaphysical scale, but instead only refers to an apparent fact of human psychology (i.e., that conscious mental states seem to play an active role in determining the choices that are made)." (emphasis mine)

You're confusing things here. All Arminianists, regardless of whether they are Open Theists or not, accept the incompatibilistic definition of free will. Calvinists accept the compatibilistic definition. You are using the compatibilistic definition (see the underlined portion), which is what Calvinists use, and not the incompatibilistic definition (second underline portion), which is what Arminianists use.

[pnattmbtc]

People have a difficult time accepting the seemingly exclusive concepts of God's foreknowledge and the free will of humanity,

I don't know why this is. Even scientists accept the Uncertainty Principle and the simultaneous phenomena of light's particle and wave properties (quantum mechanics.) Why is it so tough to accept that God already knows what you have not decided yet?

Because it's logically inconsistent.

Considering quantum mechanics, a physicist would argue that the motion of subatomic particles is random, not because of lack of knowledge, but because that is it's nature. So even God could not answer the question as to what the exact location of a subatomic particle would be, except in probabilistic terms.

[fccool]

pnattmbtc,

Quote:

You're confusing things here. All Arminianists, regardless of whether they are Open Theists or not, accept the incompatibilistic definition of free will.

I guess Arminian and Wesley were likewise confused. I just showed you from direct quotes of the guy whose views you follow that he did not believe what your view. He in effect was compatibalist. Would you let wikipedia explain him better than he himself can?

"Inclination in God is natural towards His own creature, whether the man believes or not. For that inclination does not depend on faith, and uncertainty cannot be attributed to the will of Him who, in His infinite wisdom, has all things present to Himself, and certainly foreknows all future events, even those most contingent."

....

"Prediction sometimes follows this prescience, when it pleases God to give intimations to His creatures of the issues of things, before they come to pass. But neither prediction nor any prescience induces a necessity of any thing that is afterwards to be, since they are posterior in nature and order to the thing that is future. For a thing does not come to pass because it has been foreknown or foretold; but it is foreknown and foretold because it is yet to come to pass."

This is not something I conjuring up. I've studied it extensively. James Armenian did not throw God's certain foresight out of the window because of philosophical discrepancies. Neither did Wesley. If you read their works you will understand that they had no problem with foresight. They had problem with determinism in Calvinism view: i.e. total depravity, unconditional election , irresistible grace and etc.

John Calvin is not a compatibalist, he perhaps argues from a compatibalism perspective trying to rectify God, but if you examine his arguments closely:

1) Adam had free will but lost it, thus all of the humanity born inherently evil (hence total depravity)... thus they do nothing but evil. Any good that they do is in fact evil.

2) God has to choose gracefully whom to save and whom to damn. GOD directly choose not by mere foreknowledge but by making a direct choice on behalf of human being because it is the choice humans are unable to do. His grace is irresistible, hence some men are saved and some are not.

Based on the above, how can anyone ascribe compatibalism as Calvin's view? I think we should read what people are saying before running to systematic theologies that revolve around their views.

[pnattmbtc]

No, fccool. The confusion has to do with the point being made. The point being made is that your idea of "free will" is compatibilistic, which is what Calvinists believe, and not incompatibilistic, which is what Arminians believe.

The point has to do with free will.

I underlined the key parts.

Quote:

they will argue that this choice that you make is an example of free will because no one is forcing you to make whatever choice you make.

This is what you believe. This is what Calvinists believe. This is the compatibilistic definition of "free will."

Quote:

They believe "free will" refers to genuine (e.g. absolute, ultimate) alternate possibilities for beliefs, desires or actions, rather than merely counterfactual ones.

This is not what you believe. This is what Arminianists believe. This is the incompatibilistic definition of "free will."

My comments in regards to compatibilism and incompatibilism were in regards to "free will." (not foreknowledge).

[fccool]

LOL. I don't care what the label is of what I believe about God as long as it's scripturally sound I've already shown you that your view is not something derived by way of Arminian teachings. Arminius did not believe what you are proposing to be his doctrine. I've already demonstrated it. Arminius never taught that God had limited knowledge of the future. He know that would mean that God learns, and that His knowledge is incomplete instead of being infinite, understanding and knowing every word that we utter.

Likewise, I've shown you from his direct language that he did believe that free will is compatible with foreknowledge. What you are imposing on my and his view is a Calvinism idea of free will compatibility with predestination. It's not true.

Calvin does not argue from idea of foreknowledge. Calvin argues and proposes the idea of choice on behalf of men, and letting the rest pay the conseqences for Adam's actions. I don't care what wikipedia's definition of this is... this is not "compatibalism" that I'm talking about. It has nothing to do with foreknowledge and choice of men. It's illogical. You can't say that men can't choose God, and then turn around and say that they have free choice because they make that choice. It's NOT COMPATIBLE! Period! And this is not my argument, so no need for a straw man.

My argument deals with PASSIVE foreknowledge of future events. Arminius and John Wesley did believe in this concept, open theists who claim to build on their teachings reject it by means of conjuring up "libertarian model"... which has nothing to do with human choice, but with God's ability or inability to do something. Thus if God is able to do something, then our reality does not make sense and is illogical.

So, basically to sum it all up, our free choice rests on God's limited knowledge. I don't understand how one can not see through silliness of this supposition.

[pnattmbtc]

I made a simple point. The point is that you are using the compatibilistic definition of "free will". Do you understand this? Do you dispute this?

If you don't understand what I'm saying, please state what your question is. If you dispute it, please address the issue. If you agree with my point, please acknowledge it, and we can move on to the next issue.

Please note I made a comment in regards to free will, and not to foreknowledge.

[fccool]

I can't answer this question unless you can define the "compatibilistic definition of "free will""

If by that you mean that free will is not limited by mere act of foreknowledge, then I agree. I disagree with the version of compatibalism that you've pasted from wikipedia. My point revolves around the idea of exclusivity of foreknowledge and our choice.

Yet the argument you are making basically states that if God sees something with certainty, then the future is "determined" in a sense that we don't really have free choice or free will. Would you agree with the above? (please don't chalk this view up to Calvinism, because that's not what Calvin believed and stated)

[Guest]

I believe you are right on this FC. I have seen pnatt try to argue that God did not know Lucifer would sin.

[pnattmbtc]

I can't answer this question unless you can define the "compatibilistic definition of "free will"

[pnattmbtc]

I believe you are right on this FC. I have seen pnatt try to argue that God did not know Lucifer would sin.

This isn't accurate. Accuracy is important on this subject.

[fccool]

Quote:

I don't know why you keep mixing foreknowledge in with free will. My comments in relation to the definition of "free will" have no dependency whatever on foreknowledge. Before being able to discuss the foreknowledge aspect effectively, we need to understand the definition of terms. This is why I started out defining free will, and every post I've made on the subject has been careful to specify which meaning of free will I'm referencing.

Our original discussion had nothing to do with free will, but with whether God can future with certainty... which progressed by your logic into incompatibility with free will. I was dealing with foreknowledge concept, you mentioned that it's incompatible with the idea of the free will that we as Adventists believe. I do agree with general definition of free will:

Free will is the purported ability of agents to make choices free from constraints

In which case, I don't believe that foreknowledge constraints a choice. Neither it is inconsistant with incompatibilist definition of free will... i.e.:

Incompatibilists insist, rather, that free will means that man must be the "ultimate" or "originating" cause of his actions.

I don't disagree with that definition. I don't believe that God causes men's action in 99 % of the cases, although I do believe that there are instances when God in fact does drive people to a certain choice.

Neither I disagree with Libertarian incompatibilism:

Libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires the individual to be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances.

I don't believe that either view has any relation to perfect foreknowledge in terms of causality.

Yet, for some reason you keep driving the point that these views somehow conflict with the idea of passive foreknowledge. Why?

[fccool]

Let me put it in reverse:

Let's say that God does not know for sure what I will do tomorrow

1) I will decide to choose to eat something tomorrow at 12:00 and I will choose something (or choose not to eat... whatever)

2) Let's say that I do in fact choose pizza, although I could have chosen any other course or meal. I could have, but I did not.

3) God did not see me choosing pizza and I've made a true choice

To argue that perfect foreknowledge would limit possibility of other choices is to likewise ignore that in the end there will be only 1 choice made (or not made). It's a self-contradicting argument... in either case there will be a choice. Just because one makes a choice, does not mean that one could not have made the other choice. They could, but they did not. This would be the case whether God has perfect foreknowledge or He does not.

Methinks you get stumbled over the issues of multiple possibilities, while in ontological sense these don't exist. Possibility is an imaginary construct of intellect ... it's a reality that does not and will never exist. The only thing that will exist in fact anything other than possibility... that is if we define possibility by "something that has a potential to exist, but does not". If we say that reality is only a version of multiple possibilities, then it would mean that reality is NOT the rest of possibilities.

[Guest]

Originally Posted By: Richard

I believe you are right on this FC. I have seen pnatt try to argue that God did not know Lucifer would sin.

This isn't accurate. Accuracy is important on this subject.

You don't remember? You said if God had known for sure, and created Lucifer anyway, that He (God) would be responsible for sin. Do you deny this?

[Nic Samojluk]

I agree with pnat and with Ellen White on this. True free will negates absolute foreknowledge. The openness of God teaches that God has an absolute knowledge of the present and the past, while his knowledge of the future is absolute only in terms of all the contingencies. He also has an absolute knowledge of everything he intends to do.

Quote:

Before the foundations of the world were laid, Christ, the Only Begotten of God, pledged Himself to become the Redeemer of the human race, should Adam sin. {1SM 226.1}

The above statement by Ellen White suggests that God had no absolute knowledge of Adam’s rebellion. If this is the case, then if we apply the same principle to Lucifer, we can conclude that God knew that Lucifer could choose to rebel but had no absolute knowledge that this would be the case.

[fccool]

In that case is God's knowledge complete, or does he learn things like we are? Is He truly infinite?

[John317]

I agree with pnat and with Ellen White on this. ...The above statement by Ellen White suggests that God had no absolute knowledge of Adam’s rebellion.

Why do you choose to believe Ellen White on this point, when you reject her on so many other points, such as what she wrote in PP 63-66 about God's planning for Christ's death?

If God didn't know ahead of time that Lucifer or Adam would sin, it begs the question whether He would have created them if He'd been able to know. Maybe it would have changed how God creates and who He creates. So, on the basis of that scenario, we would have a situation where God's greater knowledge, or foresight, would have improved His ability to govern the universe.

I believe the evidence shows that God knew before the Fall of either Lucifer or Adam that they would rebel. He created them because He's a God who honors freedom. He doesn't choose to not create creatures simply because of the choices He knows they will freely make after they're alive. God's foreknowledge of our lives doesn't affect our freedom to choose.

[Woody]

Quote:

"Before the foundations of the world were laid, Christ, the Only Begotten of God, pledged Himself to become the Redeemer of the human race, should Adam sin." {1SM 226.1}

Thanks for the quote. Very interesting that our prophet would say that.

[John317]

In that case is God's knowledge complete, or does he learn things like we are? Is He truly infinite?

I think a study of the prophecies shows that God's knowledge is complete. For instance, Daniel 2,7, 8, 9, and particularly chapter 11, would be impossible unless God really knows the future in great detail. Chapter 11 describes what many individuals would do. Also there are the predictions about Cyrus in Isaiah 44 and 45 before he was even born; and the prophecies about Tyre in Ezekiel 26: 1-6. These aren't simply good guesses on God's part.

[fccool]

I've made similar points as discussion on this subject progressed.

Based on the OT, the test of prophecy is in fact a test whether the prophesies made would come true.

Deut 18:21-22 (NIV)

You may say to yourselves, "How can we know when a message has not been spoken by the LORD?" If what a prophet proclaims in the name of the LORD does not take place or come true, that is a message the LORD has not spoken. That prophet has spoken presumptuously. Do not be afraid of him.

Prophecy rests on certain knowledge. Even in case of contingency, the knowledge foresees the contingency with certainty. Otherwise, this test would not make any sense.

[fccool]

I don't think that people who push Open Theism actually understand the full implications

Quote:

“Prayer affects God more powerfully than His own purposes. God’s will, words and purposes are all subject to review when the mighty potencies of prayer come in. How mighty prayer is with God may be seen as he readily sets aside His own fixed and declared purposes in answer to prayer”

I surely would like to think that God answers our prayer in that manner, but does He really? The implications of such view of prayer is that God does not already know what we want, and we have to ask Him in order for Him to grant. If we did not ask, then He does not give.

So, it becomes that if we pray to heal the sick, it would mean that He is not already at work doing what we are asking... I.E. He would not do it unless we intervene with prayer.

Here's a good read on this subject:

http://faculty.gordon.edu/hu/bi/ted_hild...sOfGod-TMSJ.pdf

[pnattmbtc]

fccool, regarding #380408, I asked some questions which I'd like you to answer. Please respond to these questions, which I'll repeat. It's difficult to carry on a conversation without having some common ground as to what we're talking about.

You wrote:

Quote:

I can't answer this question unless you can define the "compatibilistic definition of "free will"

I responded:

Quote:

I've defined it many times. You've also defined it. It's the idea of free will that you've been expressing. It's what I underlined previously:

"they will argue that this choice that you make is an example of free will because no one is forcing you to make whatever choice you make."

Here is the first question I asked you:

Quote:

This is what you've been saying, right? That one has free will if no one is forcing you to make the choice you make.

Please answer this question.

Here's a second comment I'd like to respond to:

Quote:

As I stated, my point did not involve foreknowledge, but free will. One can (and should) define free will independent of foreknowledge.

Do you agree that this is the case? It seems pretty intuitively obvious that this should be so, right? Free will isn't dependent upon foreknowledge, right? So may we agree that free will can be defined independently of free will, and agree as to what the definitions mean? When you say "free will," I understand you to mean what's written above:

Quote:

they will argue that this choice that you make is an example of free will because no one is forcing you to make whatever choice you make.

That is, you understand that a person has free will if said person is able to freely choose to do whatever said person wants to do.

This is different than the incompatabilistic idea:

Quote:

They believe "free will" refers to genuine (e.g. absolute, ultimate) alternate possibilities for beliefs, desires or actions, rather than merely counterfactual ones.

Do you understand what this means? When I've written about "free will" I've been either writing "free will (compatibilistic definition)" or "free will (libertarian definition)" -- or equivalently, for this second one "free will (incompatibilistice definition).

I want to ascertain if you understand what these definitions mean. You don't have to agree with them both (obviously not, since they're contradictory), but I'd like to ascertain that when I use these terms that you understand what I'm saying.

[pnattmbtc]

Libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires the individual to be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances.

I don't believe that either view has any relation to perfect foreknowledge in terms of causality.

Yet, for some reason you keep driving the point that these views somehow conflict with the idea of passive foreknowledge. Why?

[pnattmbtc]

Let me put it in reverse:

Let's say that God does not know for sure what I will do tomorrow

1) I will decide to choose to eat something tomorrow at 12:00 and I will choose something (or choose not to eat... whatever)

2) Let's say that I do in fact choose pizza, although I could have chosen any other course or meal. I could have, but I did not.

3) God did not see me choosing pizza and I've made a true choice

To argue that perfect foreknowledge would limit possibility of other choices is to likewise ignore that in the end there will be only 1 choice made (or not made). It's a self-contradicting argument... in either case there will be a choice. Just because one makes a choice, does not mean that one could not have made the other choice.

[pnattmbtc]

R:I believe you are right on this FC. I have seen pnatt try to argue that God did not know Lucifer would sin.

p:This isn't accurate. Accuracy is important on this subject.

R:You don't remember?

[pnattmbtc]

J:If God didn't know ahead of time that Lucifer or Adam would sin, it begs the question whether He would have created them if He'd been able to know.