The secret Downing Street memo

[Neil D]

• As originally reported in the The Times of London, May 1, 2005

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SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING

From: Matthew Rycroft

Date: 23 July 2002

S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

( Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

( The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

© CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

[:"blue"] It is rumored that misleading congress is an impeachable offense....of course, it is only a rumor. [/]

[Dr. Shane]

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But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.

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Interesting, isn't it? I think it is clear that the Bush Administration ignored, or made light of, some intelligence that didn't favor their policy. However they did have good reason to suspect Iraq was a threat to the US - including President Putin's warning that Saddam was going to attack the US with WMDs via terrorists. They also had a lot of circumstantial evidence that suggested a link between Al Quada and Saddam.

Since the invation we have discovered the oil-for-food scandel and Saddam's plan to use it in order to lift sanctions and resume his WMD programs. So it seems that Iraq was a threat to the US.

Impeachment is not likely to happen. Primarily because the Republicans control Congress. Those that oppose the President seem to be doing what they accuse him of. They are trying to fix the facts to their end. They only talk about the evidence that favors their position while ignoring or making light of the evidence against them.

President Bush wanted regime change. That is not in dispute. President Clinton wanted the same. President Bush built up the military in an effort to showdown Saddam - like President Kennedy did with Castro.

Ultimately President Bush gave Saddam 48 hours to leave Iraq and avoid war. Obviously Bush didn't want war no matter what. He was willing to let the dictator and his two criminal sons have assylum in another country. If Saddam would have back down like Castro did, he and his sons would now be living the good life in Syria, Lybia, France or some place. Thousands of lives would not have been lost in Iraq. Although the US would still, most likely, being dealing with insurgants.

[Neil D]

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Interesting, isn't it? I think it is clear that the Bush Administration ignored, or made light of, some intelligence that didn't favor their policy. However they did have good reason to suspect Iraq was a threat to the US - including President Putin's warning that Saddam was going to attack the US with WMDs via terrorists. They also had a lot of circumstantial evidence that suggested a link between Al Quada and Saddam.

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there is something about this that is in error...

For example, the Downing street memo says that in early 2002, Bush's intentions are to invade Iraq. [And we all know that Iraq was contained and threat level to the US was much lower than other countries, ie Korea.] Therefore, anything that the Bush administration has said in regard to Iraq being an immediate threat to the US, is totally bogus.

The question is now, what to do with Iraq as we have 'broken it'...And there are people there who do not want us over there and we are not allowed to repair what we have broken. Our reputation has been broken over this issue. We are making ourselves odious to other countries.

I think it is time to stop lining the pockets of Cheney's cronies and minons and get the heck out of there.

Just my opinion.

[Dr. Shane]

One must bear in mind that the Downing Street Memo in itself is hearsay. One also must not be selective about the information they look at. Remember all the world believed Iraq had WMD and Russia warned President Bush that Saddam was planing to use them to attack the US with terrorists. The threat was precieved. We now know it was real just not immediate.

[bevin]

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Remember all the world believed Iraq had WMD

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This is simply not true.

The UN Weapons Inspectors were stating loudly and clearly that they could not find any evidence that any existed, and that if the USA knew where they were, they should point the inspectors at them.

Most of the rest of the world, and about half the USA, believed them.

/Bevin

[Neil D]

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One must bear in mind that the Downing Street Memo in itself is hearsay.

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This is absolutely not true. It is NOT hearsay, as it is the record of minutes of a high level meeting with various departments and heads of departments and staterepresentatives. They are acting on information that they concider fact. The fact was brought home to them, Iraq was to be invaded BEFORE 911 occurred.

Shane, I posted a copy of the Downing Street Memo. You really need to read it....Now I know it's a long dry post, but there is a reason that it is a long dry post. It's from England, and they tend to have long dry meetings. But they are very good at keeping thier records...

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Remember all the world believed Iraq had WMD and Russia warned President Bush that Saddam was planing to use them to attack the US with terrorists.

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In addition to this, there were several reports to the president that stated there was no need to invade Iraq and a state senator who voiced concern after his visit to Iraq. Granted, these reports were lost to the mood of the country who just lost nearly 2500 people in disaster and trusted the goverment was looking out for them...instead, it was looking out for thier own interests....

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The threat was precieved. We now know it was real just not immediate.

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Regarding the weapons inspectors, Bevin said-

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Most of the rest of the world, and about half the USA, believed them.

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And about 1/2 of each of those who believed the weapons inspectors and about 1/2 of those who didn't, were willing to let them finish the job and conplete it. And that we didn't need to rush to war. Whereas [insert appropriate title]George wanted to rush in....

[there buster]

Christopher Hitchens in Slate

If you liked The Da Vinci Code, you'll love the Downing Street memo.

....But the main Downing Street document does not introduce us to any hidden or arcane or occult knowledge. As Fred Kaplan wrote in Slate last week, it explains no mystery. As protagonist Jim Dixon observes in another context in Lucky Jim, it is remarkable for "its niggling mindlessness, its funereal parade of yawn-enforcing facts, the pseudo-light it threw upon non-problems." On a visit to Washington in the prelude to the Iraq war, some senior British officials formed the strong and correct impression that the Bush administration was bent upon an intervention. Their junior note-taker committed the literary and political solecism of saying that intelligence findings and "facts" were being "fixed" around this policy.

Well, if that doesn't prove it, I don't know what does. We apparently have an administration that can, on the word of a British clerk, "fix" not just findings but also "facts." Never mind for now that the English employ the word "fix" in a slightly different way—a better term might have been "organized."

We have been here before. In an interview with Sam Tanenhaus for Vanity Fair more than two years ago, Paul Wolfowitz allowed that, though there were many reasons to seek the removal of Saddam Hussein, the legal minimum basis for it was to be sought, inside the U.S. government bureaucracy and at the United Nations, in the unenforced resolutions concerning WMD. At the time, this mild observation was also hailed as a full confession of perfidy.

I am now forced to wonder: Who is there who does not know that the Bush administration decided after September 2001 to change the balance of power in the region and to enforce the Iraq Liberation Act, passed unanimously by the Senate in 1998, which made it overt American policy to change the government of Iraq? This was a fairly open conspiracy, and an open secret. Given that everyone from Hans Blix to Jacques Chirac believed that Saddam was hiding weapons from inspectors, it made legal sense to advance this case under the banner of international law and to treat Saddam "as if" (and how else?) his strategy of concealment and deception were prima facie proof. The British attorney general—who has no jurisdiction in these 50 states—was worried that "regime change" alone would not be a sufficient legal basis. One appreciates his concern. But the existence of the Saddam regime was itself a defiance of all known international laws, and we had before us the consequences of previous failures to act, in Bosnia and Rwanda, where action would have been another word for "regime change."

Many in the British Foreign Office, like many in the American State Department and the CIA, felt more comfortable with the status quo as they knew it (which might explain the hapless references elsewhere in the memos to Iraq's "Sunni majority"). But theirs is only one opinion among many. How odd that the American left, when it is not busy swallowing the unpunctuated words of the CIA, follows this with another helping of wisdom from the most reactionary institution of the British state.

If such a "left" is not careful, it will end up consoling itself in futile bitterness and resentment in the way that the Old Right used to do: by brooding on the hellish manner in which FDR told the Japanese to "bring it on" at Pearl Harbor. (The anti-war right of today, led by Pat Buchanan, was raised and nurtured on this very fantasy, as were Gore Vidal and the other Charles Lindbergh fans.) I am in favor of taking such theories at face value, as a thought experiment, to see how they pan out. It is clear that Roosevelt hoped that the Japanese empire would make a mistake and furnish a pretext for war: The plain evidence of this hope is what keeps the conspiracy theory alive. I myself rather doubt that he would have wanted to start such a war with the loss of the Pacific Fleet, but still, he did think a confrontation was inevitable, as indeed it was. And William Casey may have seen the chance for a double coup: taking credit for the release of the Iranian hostages and discrediting Jimmy Carter into the bargain. But if it had all come out at the time, and been proven, would this change my attitude to Japanese imperialism or to Iranian hostage-taking theocracy? Certainly not. The demand would be to impeach those responsible in Washington and to form a national bipartisan alliance to fight even harder against our enemies, and in defense of our friends.

Full circle, then: The outrage about the nondisclosures in the Downing Street memos has led Congressman Walter Jones of North Carolina to demand that we tell the al-Qaida forces in Iraq exactly when we intend to give up. Jones is the right-wing bigmouth who once wanted to rename French fries "freedom fries." He was a moral and political cretin when he did that and, not to my surprise, he has been unable to stop being a moral and political cretin since. He and his new friends are welcome to each other. They illustrate exactly how the credulous search for Da Vinci codes is the sign of feeble minds.

[Dr. Shane]

"Downing Street Memo" is old news.

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Of course, the memo simply contains the impressions of an aide of the impressions of British-cabinet officials of the impressions of unnamed people they spoke to in the United States about what they thought the president was thinking. It is sad when hearsay thrice-removed raises this kind of ruckus, especially since a version had been reported three years ago. As smoking guns go, it is not high caliber.

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Was WMDs the only justification for war?

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so much emphasis was placed on the WMD rationale that the failure to turn up the expected weapons brought the entire regime-change effort into question. However, there were other ways the U.N. might have been engaged. The mismanagement and barefaced corruption of the "Oil for Food" program could have been leveraged for this same purpose.

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Did the Bush Administration "cook the books"?

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This passage needs some clarification. Maybe Rycroft or Dearlove could elaborate; by "fixed around" did they mean that intelligence was being falsified or that intelligence and information were being gathered to support the policy? There is nothing wrong with the latter — it is the purpose of the intelligence community to provide the information decision-makers need, and the marshal their resources accordingly.

But if Dearlove meant the former, he should be called upon to substantiate his charge. It can be weighed against the exhaustive investigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on prewar intelligence assessments in Iraq. The committee examined this very question, whether the White House had pressured the intelligence community to reach predetermined conclusions supporting the case for war. The investigation found no evidence that "administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities" or that "the Vice President's visits to the Central Intelligence Agency were attempts to pressure analysts, were perceived as intended to pressure analysts by those who participated in the briefings on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, or did pressure analysts to change their assessments."

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The following intelligence services believed Iraq had WMDs: Israel, Spain, France, Iran, Russia, UK, Australia, Germany, UN, Egypt, Jordan, China and Italy. So it wasn’t everyone.